Labels for Misbehavior in a Population with Short-Run Players

Luciana Moscoso Boedo

No DTE 468, Working Papers from CIDE, División de Economía

Abstract: This paper studies how an information mechanism that labels defectors can sustain cooperative behavior in communities containing a subset of short-run players. This is done in the context of a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. The paper presents sufficient conditions for a sustainable equilibrium under different information technologies that identify defectors. It also analyzes imperfect labeling mechanisms.

Keywords: Misbehavior; Short-Run Players; repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009-12
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