A Note on Bargaining over Complementary Pieces of Information in Networks

Kaniska Dam () and Antonio Jimenez-Martinez
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Kaniska Dam: Division of Economics, CIDE

No DTE 504, Working Papers from CIDE, División de Economía

Abstract: We consider two specific network structures, the star and the line, and study the set of bilateral alternating-offers bargaining procedures for the pairs of connected agents. Agents have complementary information and bargain over the relative price of their pieces of information. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for each of these network structures.

Keywords: Bargaining; Information; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2011-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: A note on bargaining over complementary pieces of information in networks (2012)
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