Choosing Democracy Over Party? How Civic Education Can Mitigate the Anti-Democratic Effects of Partisan Polarization

Melek Hilal Eroglu (), Steven Finkel, Anja Neundorf, Aykut Ozturk and Ericka Rascon-Ramirez
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Melek Hilal Eroglu: University of Pittsburgh
Steven Finkel: University of Pittsburgh
Anja Neundorf: University of Glasgow
Aykut Ozturk: University of Glasgow

No DTE 647, Working Papers from CIDE, División de Economía

Abstract: How can the negative effects of partisan polarization on democratic attitudes be mitigated? Can polarized individuals be persuaded to choose democracy over party, i.e., support a candidate from an opposing party who upholds democratic norms when their co-partisan candidate fails to do so? We tested the effect of an online civic education intervention conducted on over 41,000 individuals in 33 countries that was designed to promote the choice for "democracy" by emphasizing the benefits of democratic versus autocratic regimes. The results are striking: exposure to civic education messages significantly dampens the negative effect of partisan polarization on anti-democratic co-partisan candidate choice. Civic education also has a small positive effect on polarization itself, with further exploration showing that this is the result of increased evaluations of parties that uphold democratic norms and practices, resulting in greater differences between democratic and antidemocratic parties.

Keywords: Civic education; partisan polarization; democratization; online experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2025-02
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