Determinants of corporate anti-takeover provisions

Juan Santaló ()
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Juan Santaló: Instituto de Empresa
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan Santalo

Working Papers Economia from Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment

Abstract: In this paper I study empirically the industry and firm characteristics that determine the level of corporate antitakeover protection. I find that the level of antitakeover protection is negatively associated with the level of firm-specific organizational capital and with stock market volatility. On the other hand, firms that allow a larger degree of antitakeover protection to their managers do indeed invest more in long term projects and operate in more concentrated industries. All these findings are consistent with a managerial entrenchment interpretation of corporate antitakeover provisions.

Keywords: Takeover defenses; Organizational capital; Product market competition; Managerial compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk
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