Resource location games

Loe Schlicher, Marieke Musegaas and Evelot Westerink-Duijzer

No EI2019-05, Econometric Institute Research Papers from Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core nonemptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource- Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed.

Keywords: cooperative game; core; resource-profit allocations; reallocation of resources (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2019-02-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ems:eureir:115180

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