Rent Seeking for Export Licenses: Application to the Vietnam Rice Market
Tan Vu (),
Duc Hong Vo and
Michael McAleer
No EI2019-09, Econometric Institute Research Papers from Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute
Abstract:
The paper develops a model to examine rent seeking in innovation and export licenses, with an application to Vietnam rice exports. Firms can lobby for export restrictions or for free trade. Innovation is introduced as a cost-reducing technology. The analysis focuses on the innovation incentives of the firm lobbying for export restrictions, and the determinants of lobbying incentives. The analysis shows that firms lobbying for export restrictions may have lower incentives to adopt technological innovations under export restrictions than under free trade. The findings can help to identify economic inefficiency when the political elites use export restrictions to seek rents.
Keywords: Trade restrictions; export licenses; innovation; monopoly; rent seeking; free trade; economic development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F63 G1 L12 O13 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2019-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-int, nep-pol and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/115607/EI2019-09.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Rent seeking for export licenses: Application to the Vietnam rice market (2019) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ems:eureir:115607
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Econometric Institute Research Papers from Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePub ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).