On linear programming duality and necessary and sufficient conditions in minimax theory

Hans Frenk, P. Kas and G. Kassay

No EI 2004-14, Econometric Institute Research Papers from Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute

Abstract: In this paper we discuss necessary and sufficient conditions for different minimax results to hold using only linear programming duality and the finite intersection property of compact sets. It turns out that these necessary and sufficient conditions have a clear interpretation within zero-sum game theory. In the last section we apply these results to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for strong Lagrangean duality for a large class of optimization problems.

Keywords: Lagrangian and linear programming duality; finite dimensional separation; game theory; minimax theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04-14
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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