A strategic analysis of network reliability
V. Bala and
No EI 9929-/A, Econometric Institute Research Papers from Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute
We consider a non-cooperative model of information networks where communication is costly and not fully reliable. We examine the nature of Nash networks and efficient networks.
Keywords: communication; coordination games; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ems:eureir:1599
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