The political economy of regionalism

Sanjeev Goyal and Klaas Staal

No EI 9957-/A, Econometric Institute Research Papers from Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute

Abstract: We examine the incentives of regions in a country to unite or to separate. We find that smaller regions have greater incentives to unite, relative to larger regions. We show, however, that on the whole, majority voting on separation and union generates excessive incentives to separate. This leads us to examine the scope of alternative political insititutions and rules in overcoming the potential inefficciency. Our paper also provides a wide range of examples to illustrate the different instituions used in actual practice to resolve such problems.

Keywords: referendum; secession; union; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-12-31
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Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of regionalism (2004)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Regionalism (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ems:eureir:1633

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