Does the mixture of policy instruments matter? An empirical test of government support for the private provision of public goods

Arjen Mulder

ERIM Report Series Research in Management from Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam

Abstract: Governments wishing to encourage the private sector provision of a public good can choose amongst a wide variety of economic instruments. This paper analyses how governments in the EU(15) countries have succeeded in stimulating investment in wind turbines between 1985 and 2000, using national laws and decrees, IEA/OECD data on wind turbines, and one hypothetical investment project to calculate Tobin's Q. The main question addressed is whether the portfolio of policy instruments matters, or whether government support for the private provision of a public good is a matter of a pecuniary transferral.

Keywords: Tobin's Q; fiscal investment incentives; private provision of public goods; renewable energy; subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 G3 H23 H41 M Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09-13
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