Marketing co-operatives

George Hendrikse and Cees Veerman

ERIM Report Series Research in Management from Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam

Abstract: Marketing co-operatives (MCs) are analysed from an incomplete contracting perspective. The requirement of the domination of control by the members of a MC is a threat to the survival of a MC in markets where the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is increasing. However, a MC may remain an efficient governance structure when the increasing level of asset specificity is compensated for by a sufficient increase in the extent of product differentiation.

Keywords: incomplete contracts; marketing cooperatives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 G3 L2 M M10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-05-18
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