On Noncooperative Games and Minimax Theory

Hans Frenk and G. Kassay

ERIM Report Series Research in Management from Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam

Abstract: In this note we review some known minimax theorems with applications in game theory and show that these results form an equivalent chain which includes the strong separation result in finite dimensional spaces between two disjoint closed convex sets of which one is compact. By simplifying the proofs we intend to make the results more accessible to researchers not familiar with minimax or noncooperative game theory.

Keywords: minimax results; noncooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 M M11 R4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-06-01
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