Economics Working Papers

From LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school)
Contact information at EDIRC.
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6: Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries...")

Nicolas Gruyer

5: A model of airport slot allocation with posted prices

Nicolas Gruyer and Kevin Guittet

4: Quantity precommitment, Cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs

Nicolas Gruyer

3: When cost improvements harm consumers

Nicolas Gruyer and Philippe Bontems

2: Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude

Nicolas Gruyer

1: Auctioning airport slots (?)

Nicolas Gruyer and Nathalie Lenoir