Auctioning airport slots (?)
Nicolas Gruyer and
Nathalie Lenoir ()
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Nicolas Gruyer: LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC
Nathalie Lenoir: LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC
No 1, Economics Working Papers from LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school)
The current allocation of slots on congested European airports constitutes an obstacle to the effective liberalisation of air transportation undertaken in Europe. With a view to favouring efficient slot utilisation and competition, as is the goal of the European commission, we propose to use a market mechanism, based on temporary utilisation licences. In order to allocate those licences, we propose and describe an iterated combinatorial auction mechanism where a percentage of licences would be reallocated each season. A secondary market would also be set up in order to reallocate slots during a season. Since a combinatorial auction involve a complex optimisation procedure, we describe how it can be made to work in the case of auctions.
Keywords: slots; airports; licence; auction; combinatorial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L93 L98 H54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18.
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