Quantity precommitment, Cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs

Nicolas Gruyer
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Nicolas Gruyer: LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC

No 4, Economics Working Papers from LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school)

Abstract: This note extends Kreps and Scheinkman's result -showing that a production capacity choice stage followed by price competition yields the same outcome as a Cournot game- to a setting where capacity costs are asymmetric.

Keywords: capacity; Bertrand competition; Kreps-Scheinkman; asymmetric costs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2006-08-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8.
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