Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices
Daniel Ralph and
University of Cambridge
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Xinmin Hu: University of New South Wales
Daniel Ralph: Judge Business School
No EPRG 0602, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge
Keywords: electricity market; bilevel game; MPEC; EPEC; Nash stationary point; equilibrium constraints; complementarity problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C62 C72 Q40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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