The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions

Pär Holmberg and David M Newbery

No EPRG 1007, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: Wholesale electricity markets; supply function equilibria; auction design; competition policy; market regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D43 D44 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions (2010)
Working Paper: The Supply Function Equilibrium and its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions (2010)
Working Paper: The Supply Function Equilibrium and Its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions (2009)
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