Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope

Pär Holmberg and Bert Willems

No EPRG 1224, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: Supply function equilibrium; Option contracts; Strategic commitment; Speculation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D43 D44 G13 L13 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope (2015)
Working Paper: Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope (2015)
Working Paper: Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope (2012)
Working Paper: Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope (2012)
Working Paper: Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope (2012)
Working Paper: Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope (2012)
Working Paper: Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope (2012)
Working Paper: Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope (2012)
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