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Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctions

Pär Holmberg ()

No EPRG 1414, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: Divisible-good auctions; multi-unit auctions; rationing rules; bidding format (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctions (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Pro-Competitive Rationing in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014) Downloads
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