Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctions
Pär Holmberg ()
No EPRG 1414, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge
Keywords: Divisible-good auctions; multi-unit auctions; rationing rules; bidding format (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions (2017)
Working Paper: Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctions (2014)
Working Paper: Pro-Competitive Rationing in Multi-Unit Auctions (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1414
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ruth Newman ().