Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs

Pär Holmberg and Frank Wolak
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Frank Wolak: Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) and Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA

No EPRG 1523, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: cost uncertainty; asymmetric information; uniform-price auction; discriminatory pricing; Bertrand game; market transparency; wholesale electricity market; treasury auction; Bayesian Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D44 L13 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs (2015)
Working Paper: Electricity Markets: Designing Auctions Where Suppliers Have Uncertain Costs (2015)
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