The prisoner's dilemma in Cournot models: when endogenizing the level of competition leads to competitive behaviors

Ibrahim Abada and Andreas Ehrenmann
Additional contact information
Andreas Ehrenmann: ENGIE

No EPRG 1619, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: Imperfect competition; export oligopoly; open and closed loop Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/eprg-wp1619.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The prisoner’s dilemma in Cournot models: when endogenizing the level of competition leads to competitive behaviors (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:enp:wpaper:eprg1619

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ruth Newman ().