Capacity mechanisms and the technology mix in competitive electricity markets

Pär Holmberg and Robert Ritz

No EPRG1921, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: Investment; wholesale electricity market; capacity mechanism; capacity auction; strategic reserve (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D41 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Capacity mechanisms and the technology mix in competitive electricity markets (2019)
Working Paper: Capacity Mechanisms and the Technology Mix in Competitive Electricity Markets (2019)
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