Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms

Pär Holmberg and Thomas Tangerås ()

No EPRG2109, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: Capacity mechanism; market design; reliability; resource efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D25 D47 Q40 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-ene and nep-isf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms (2021)
Working Paper: Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms (2021)
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