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Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction

Leonardo Becchetti (), Stefano Castriota and Pierluigi Conzo ()

No wp29, Econometica Working Papers from Econometica

Abstract: In low income countries grass-root collective action is a well known substitute for government provision of public goods. In our research we wonder what is its effect on the law of motion of social capital, a crucial microeconomic determinant of economic development. To this purpose we structure a ?sandwich? experiment in which participants play a public good game (PGG) between two trust games (TG1 and TG2). Our findings show that the change in trustworthiness between the two trust game rounds generated by the PGG treatment is crucially affected by the subjective satisfaction about the PGG rather than by standard objective measures related to PGG players? behavior. These results highlight that subjective satisfaction after collective action has relevant predictive power on social capital creation providing information which can be crucial to design successful self-organized resource regimes.

Keywords: trust games; public good games; randomized experiment; social capital; subjective wellbeing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O12 C93 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hap, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Related works:
Journal Article: Social capital dynamics and collective action: the role of subjective satisfaction in a common pool resource experiment (2016) Downloads
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