Allocation criteria under task performance: the gendered preference for protection

Leonardo Becchetti, Giacomo Degli Antoni (), Stefania Ottone and Nazaria Solferino
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Nazaria Solferino: University of Calabria-Unical

No wp32, Econometica Working Papers from Econometica

Abstract: We device a randomized experiment with task performance in which players directly decide allocation criteria (with/without) veil of ignorance on payoff distribution under different criteria in a stakeholder/spectator position. Our main result is a strong and significant gender effect: women choose significantly more protection (that is, they choose criteria in which a part or all the total sum of money that must be allocated among participants is equally distributed) before (but not after) the removal of the veil of ignorance. They also reveal less overconfidence and significantly higher civicness and inequality aversion in ex post questionnaire responses, even though such differences are not enough to fully capture our main result. The puzzle when interpreting it is that the gendered preference for protection exists not only for stakeholders but also for spectators while it disappears for both once we remove the veil of ignorance. This makes it impossible to explain it exclusively with risk or competition aversion.

Keywords: Distributive Justice; Gender Effects; Risk Aversion; Competition Aversion; Veil of Ignorance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2011-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Allocation criteria under task performance: The gendered preference for protection (2013)
Working Paper: Allocation Criteria under Task Performance: the Gendered Preference for Protection (2011)
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