Inclusive and Exclusive Social Preferences: A Deweyan Framework to Explain Governance Heterogeneity

Silvia Sacchetti

No wp36, Econometica Working Papers from Econometica

Abstract: We suggest that Dewey's theory of value formation has implications for the contraposition between individual and social preferences in economics. We re-consider that distinction and introduce, instead, the notions of inclusive and exclusive social preferences. We then apply this distinction to governance forms and suggest an explanatory framework of governance heterogeneity which contrasts exclusive and inclusive governance structures. In the final discussion we illustrate a possible use of the framework for assessing cooperatives and social enterprises as well as traditional corporations. More generally, we argue that the assessment of governance heterogeneity would benefit from a consideration of the type of social preferences underlying formal as well as substantive involvement of publics.

Keywords: private-public dichotomy; social preferences; pragmatism; governance heterogeneity; stakeholders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B00 L2 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2012-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econometica.it/wp/wp36.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Inclusive and Exclusive Social Preferences: A Deweyan Framework to Explain Governance Heterogeneity (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp36

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Econometica Working Papers from Econometica Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matteo Rizzolli ().