Thou shalt not steal (from hard-working people)An experiment on respect for property claims

Marco Faillo (), Matteo Rizzolli and Stephan Tontrup
Additional contact information
Stephan Tontrup: New York University

No wp58, Econometica Working Papers from Econometica

Abstract: Abstract The institution of property is void without legal and social enforcement against theft. To address wasteful competition over resources, societies have long developed strategies that encompass -inter alia- behavioral traits, social norms and legal institutions to promote the respect and enforcement of property rights. On the other hand, a growing body of biological and ethological evidence suggests that several other animal species establish and respect some forms of property even in the absence of institutions. Would human beings respect others' property in the absence of institutions? Do people posses some innate sense of property, or do they respect property only because of legal and social enforcement? In this study, we explore this issue with a lab experiment that resembles a famous thought experiment proposed by Plato. As Plato sought to understand how one ought to behave when he or sheis completely shielded by the consequences of his actions,we study whether people respect property once full anonymity is granted. In this experiment, we implement a Free-Form Dictator game where participants can both give and take up to five scratchcards from a passive counterpart that they have either previously bought outside the lab with their own money (legal treatments) or gained inside the lab via an effort task (effortful treatments). In conclusion to the experiment, evidence is provided of a (weak) sense of property. We also provide evidence that property in the lab is better established through an effort tasks than through the use of subject's own real property brought from outside the lab.

Keywords: property rights; dictator game; bully game; taking; stealing; anonymity; effort; scratchcards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D23 K11 P14 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econometica.it/wp/wp58.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp58

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Econometica Working Papers from Econometica Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matteo Rizzolli ().