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Fairness and the unselfish demand for redistribution by taxpayers and welfare recipients

Fabio Sabatini, Marco Ventura, Eiji Yamamura () and Luca Zamparelli

No wp64, Econometica Working Papers from Econometica

Abstract: We illustrate how the desire to live in a fair society that rewards individual effort and hard work triggers an unselfish though rational demand for redistribution. This leads the well off to prefer higher taxes and the poor to reject extreme progressivity. We then provide evidence of these behaviors using a nationally representative survey from Italy. Our empirical analysis confirms that a stronger aversion to unfair distributive outcomes is associated with a higher support for redistribution by individuals with high income and to a lower demand for redistribution by those with low income.

Keywords: fairness; income distribution; inequalities; taxation; welfare; redistribution; free-riding; civic capital; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D69 H10 H53 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ltv
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Fairness and the Unselfish Demand for Redistribution by Taxpayers and Welfare Recipients (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Fairness and the unselfish demand for redistribution by taxpayers and welfare recipients (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Fairness and the unselfish demand for redistribution by taxpayers and welfare recipients (2017) Downloads
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