Voting Share Reform at the IMF: Will it Make a Difference?

Mark Weisbrot and Jake Johnston ()

CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs from Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract: For more than 20 years there have been efforts to reform the IMF through changing its voting structure. There are structural limits to both the success, in quantitative terms, of changing these limits; and to the impact of any changes that are won. Ignoring these constraints for the moment, it should in principle be possible to give more voice to the majority of the world’s governments, and by extension their people, by increasing voting shares of low- and middle-income countries; and in this way to possibly make IMF policy better reflect and serve the interests of the majority of the world’s population, especially in low- and middle-income countries.

JEL-codes: F F5 F53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/IMF-voting-shares-2016-04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:epo:papers:2016-09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs from Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().