Informalization Dynamics and Gains: Why Want a Job Contract?

Ahmed Elsayed () and Jackline Wahba

No 1001, Working Papers from Economic Research Forum

Abstract: This paper examines the dynamics of informality and the extent to which informal workers (without job contracts) transit to formal employment (with job contracts) and whether this transition has changed over time and in particular during the recent political and economic turmoil in Egypt. It also investigates the potential gains/losses associated with holding a job contract. Using panel data from Egypt, we find that after the Arab Spring Revolution, the probability to work without a contract increased, and conditional on being informally employed, the probability to switch from private informal to private formal employment decreased. We also find that working without contract is associated with pay penalty. This pay penalty has increased significantly over time. Furthermore, using Difference in difference techniques, the results show that moving from employment without contract to one with contract is associated with a substantial wage premium.

Pages: 19
Date: 2016-05, Revised 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara and nep-iue
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published by The Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Downloads: (external link)
http://erf.org.eg/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/1001.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://erf.org.eg/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/1001.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://erf.org.eg/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/1001.pdf)
http://bit.ly/1rHJdE5

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:erg:wpaper:1001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Economic Research Forum Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Namees Nabeel ().