Standards and Market Power: Evidence from Tunisia
Hendrik Kruse (),
Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso and
Additional contact information
Hendrik Kruse: University of Jordan
No 1131, Working Papers from Economic Research Forum
We develop a theoretical model and derive conditions under which firms with market power try to influence the setting of quality standards and describe the political equilibrium. We show that in political equilibrium the positive association only holds for a restricted set of initial values of the firm’s market share, if the government ascribes a positive value to consumer welfare. We test our hypothesis using Tunisian data for the years 2002-2010. In our main results, we find a higher incidence of SPS measures in sectors where firms connected to former president Ben Ali have a higher share in imports. However, this association only holds for sectors with high tariffs. For low tariff sectors, we find that Ben Ali firms are associated with more TBTs. A higher concentration of market power in itself does not lead to higher standards, leading us to the conclusion that political power is essential.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-bec and nep-com
Date: 2017, Revised 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Published by The Economic Research Forum (ERF)
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:erg:wpaper:1131
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Economic Research Forum Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sherine Ghoneim ().