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Political Determinants of Government Structure and Economic Performance in Turkey since 1950

Ali Akarca ()

No 1241, Working Papers from Economic Research Forum

Abstract: During the last two-thirds of a century, Turkey was ruled by a wide variety of governments: single-party governments, coalitions partnered by two or more parties and by ideologically compatible and incompatible parties, minority and military governments. While single party governments all lasted at least two terms, the rest rarely lasted even one term. The timing of these governments and the order in which they followed each other were not by chance but according to a pattern induced by coups. Typically single party governments were ended by coups. Ideologically incompatible and then compatible coalition governments followed, usually after a brief military administration. Then once again single party governments returned. As economic growth typically exhibits an inverted-U type of pattern over the life of a government, and declines as the number of ruling parties and the ideological distance between them increase, the coups lowered the growth rate of the country and generated political business cycles that are distinct from those induced by elections. In the paper, these assertions are explained in detail, and supported using theory, history, descriptive statistics, and regression analysis. It is also shown that improving democratic institutions of the country would enhance the stability and growth of the economy greatly.

Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2018-10-23, Revised 2018-10-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-gro, nep-his and nep-pol
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Published by The Economic Research Forum (ERF)

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