Economics at your fingertips  

Patrons or Clients? Measuring and Experimentally Evaluating Political Connections of Firms in Morocco and Jordan

Robert Kubinec

No 1280, Working Papers from Economic Research Forum

Abstract: I use an original survey of firm employees in Morocco and Jordan to construct an index of political-connectedness that collapses several possible indicators of connectedness down to a single latent dimension. To do so, I employ item-response theory on a subset of questions from the survey for which I have a prior theoretical reason to believe that these factors should either be caused by or cause political-connectedness. With this index, I can better understand political-connectedness as a continuous measure that reflects the broad range of political interactions firms may have rather than as a dichotomous measure of connected versus nonconnected firms. I also employ an experimental design embedded in the survey that simulated a hypothetical interaction between the firm and a party offering political benefits in exchange for resources in order to understand if this measure of political connectedness can predict political activity across domains. I show that politically-connected firms are able to exchange political loyalty to regimes for lighter regulatory burdens and access to protected markets that insulate them from competition.

Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2018-12-26, Revised 2018-12-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published by The Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found ( [301 Moved Permanently]--> (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Economic Research Forum Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Namees Nabeel ().

Page updated 2024-07-15
Handle: RePEc:erg:wpaper:1280