EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Constitution’s Gift? A deliberative democratic analysis of constitution-making in the European Union

John Erik Fossum & Agustín José Menéndez

No 13, ARENA Working Papers from ARENA

Abstract: Our aim in this article is to consider whether the Union’s deliberation over and decision-making on constitutional norms, can contribute to render it more democratic. From a normative perspective, the way a constitution is forged has deep implications for its democratic legitimacy. In light of recent events, we consider how procedural changes in constitution-making might contribute to rectify the Union’s democratic deficit. To do so we first develop a thin model of constitution-making based on the central tenets of deliberative democracy. We seek to outline how a legitimate constitution-making process will look from a deliberative democratic perspective. Second, we distil out some of the core characteristics of the Intergovernmental Conference (hereafter, IGC) model and assess this against the normative model, to establish the democratic quality of the IGC model. Third, we assess the current Laeken process by means of spelling out the central tenets of this mode of constitution-making, and we assess it in relation to the normative standards of the deliberative model. In the fourth and final step, we consider what contribution constitution-making might make to the handling of the EU’s legitimacy deficit(s). This article has later been published in European Law Journal vol. 11, No.4, pp. 380-410

Keywords: deliberative democracy; constitution building; legitimacy; normative political theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03-14
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2005/papers/05_13.xml Full text (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:erp:arenax:p0013

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ARENA Working Papers from ARENA
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sindre Eikrem Hervig (s.e.hervig@arena.uio.no this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:erp:arenax:p0013