Courts and Compliance in the European Union: The European Arrest Warrant in National Constitutional Courts

Scott Siegel

No 5, Jean Monnet Working Papers from Jean Monnet Chair

Abstract: Abstract: The member states of the European Union have expanded the tools they use to cooperate to combat transnational crime and terrorism. Chief among these is the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, which requires judicial and police authorities to bypass all national extradition procedures involving suspects residing in a EU member state. Only Germany, Poland, Italy, and the Republic of Cyprus experienced severe delays in implementing the required national legislation. Contrary to the expectations of veto player theory, national constitutional courts do not veto EU law, but instruct legislatures on how best to redraft legislation, securing compliance.

Keywords: implementation; security/internal; Third Pillar; European law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09-05
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