The EU Constitutional Treaty and its distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts – Oranges into apples?

Jonas Bering Liisberg

No 1, Jean Monnet Working Papers from Jean Monnet Chair

Abstract: Abstract: The paper examines the introduction of a distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts in the Constitutional Treaty. The drafting history and the possible implications are analyzed. Questions covered include: Was the introduction of the distinction necessary in terms of clarification or was it primarily a lever to strengthen support for more powers to the European Parliament and the Commission? Could the distinction nurture false expectations of what the EU is, or could it undermine efforts at improving transparency and enforcement of subsidiarity? The paper concludes that the distinction probably has little real significance and no serious counterproductive effects. The drafting history and analysis illustrate the pitfalls of analogies to national constitutional orders and the complexity of simplification.

Date: 2006-01-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:erp:jeanmo:p0231

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