Political Contestation in the Shadow of Hierarchy

Niclas Meyer

No 6, Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs) from London School of Economics / European Institute

Abstract: In the public policy literature, there is a widespread belief that industry self-regulation would only take place—and lead to satisfactory results—if industry was faced with a credible threat of hierarchical government intervention. At the example of intermodal transport standardization, however, this paper demonstrates that this does not have to be the case. It may even have a counterproductive effect by exposing self-regulatory processes to political contestation.

Keywords: standardisation; governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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