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The Bounded Creativity of Domestic Appropriation Explaining Selective Flexicurity in Continental Countries

Sascha Zirra

No 2, Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po from Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris

Abstract: In complementing the insights of historical institutionalism by accounting for the role ofstrategic action in domestic employment policy reforms, this paper aims to unravel themechanisms of domestic Europeanization. We argue that creative appropriation constitutes apivotal strategy of skilled social actors seeking to increase the relevance and legitimacyascribed to their change project within institutionalized domestic fields. However, theircreativity is institutionally framed. In comparing France, Germany and Italy in a most-similar systemdesign, we provide evidence that the domestic opportunity structure for craftinginstitutional connectivity and forming a dominant coalition is an important factor for explainingnot only the scope but the mechanisms and policy fields of domestic Europeanization.

Keywords: France; Germany; Italy; Europeanization; neo-institutionalism; unemployment; employment policy; social policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:erp:scpoxx:p0001

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