How to Choose the European Executive: A Counterfactual Analysis (1979-1999)

Gérard Roland

No 1, Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po from Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris

Abstract: In this paper, we use data on roll-call votes by MEP’s in the five elected EuropeanParliaments (1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999) to evaluate the likely impact of current proposalsin the Convention on the Future of Europe for the appointment of the European executive. Wefind (a) that the different procedures for appointing the Commission lead to quite differentresults in terms of the composition of the Commission, (b) that election of the President of theCommission by the national parliaments (our preferred mode of appointment) gives the resultthat is most in line with the observed composition of the Commission since 1979, whereas (c)election by the European Parliament creates a ‘built-in’ form of divided government betweenthe Council and the Commissio n that could prove counterproductive for the functioning ofEuropean institutions.

Keywords: European Parliament; European Parliament; European Convention; European Commission; European Council (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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