How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?

Pablo Brañas-Garza and Antonio Morales ()

IESA Working Papers Series from Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research

Abstract: In this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in di.erent categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.

Keywords: prisoners’ dilemma; payment cards, social conflict. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esa:iesawp:0407

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