How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment

Enrique Fatas (), Tibor Neugebauer and Pilar Tamborero

IESA Working Papers Series from Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research

Abstract: The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is taken to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects exist but that expertise may weaken the deviation from rational choice.

Keywords: subject pool effect; subject surrogacy, expected utility theory; prospect theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2004
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Related works:
Journal Article: How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esa:iesawp:0410

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