When the past is present – The ratchet effect in the local commons

Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling (), Magdalena Margreiter and Nuria Oses Eraso

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behavior, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only, what can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis has typically been restricted to a particular game, we consider a more complex environment by combining different games which – studied in isolation – yield opposite implications for the survival of inequality aversion. Persistent divergence between intrinsic motivation and true material success is possible depending on the type of inequality aversion considered as well as on agents’ ability to discriminate between the different games they face.

Keywords: Public Goods; Social Dilemma; Experimental Economics; Ratchet Effect; Local Interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D62 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2003-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-mfd and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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