Is playing alone in the darkness sufficient to prevent informational cascades?
Annamaria Fiore () and
Andrea Morone ()
Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group
Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out the existence of information negative externalities, and propose to destroy information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been studied, this particular aspect has never been extensively analysed. In this article we investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, whether and to which extent destroying information can improve welfare.
JEL-codes: C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Is playing alone in the darkness sufficient to prevent informational cascades? (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2005-09
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