Constitutional Interests in the Face of Innovations: How Much Do We Need to Know about Risk Preferences?
Ulrich Witt and
Christian Schubert ()
Papers on Economics and Evolution from Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography
In constitutional political economy, the citizensâ€™ constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interest are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizensâ€™ constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.
Keywords: constitutional preferences; social contract; original position; innovation; risk preferences Length 34 pages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H10 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-pol and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences? (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:evopap:2008-03
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