Attractive evolutionary equilibria
Reinoud Joosten and
Papers on Economics and Evolution from Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography
We present attractiveness, a re nement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa.
Keywords: attractive evolutionary equilibria; evolutionary dynamics; evolutionary; dynamic & structural stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:evopap:2011-17
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