Naïve and capricious: Stumbling into the ring of self-control conflict

Kristian Ove R. Myrseth and Conny Wollbrant
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Kristian Ove R. Myrseth: ESMT European School of Management and Technology

No ESMT-11-09, ESMT Research Working Papers from ESMT European School of Management and Technology

Abstract: We model self-control conflict as a stochastic struggle of an agent against a visceral influence, which impels the agent to act sub-optimally. The agent holds costly pre-commitment technology to avoid the conflict altogether and may decide whether to procure pre-commitment or to confront the visceral influence. We examine naïve expectations for the strength of the visceral influence; underestimating the visceral influence may lead the agent to exaggerate the expected utility of resisting temptation, and so mistakenly forego pre-commitment. Our analysis reveals conditions under which higher willpower – and lower visceral influence – reduces welfare. We further demonstrate that lowering risk aversion could reduce welfare. The aforementioned results call into question certain policy measures aimed at helping people improve their own behavior.

Keywords: self-control; temptation; inter-temporal choice; pre-commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D03 D69 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2011-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Economic Psychology 34(1): 8–19

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http://static.esmt.org/publications/workingpapers/ESMT-11-09.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Naïve and Capricious: Stumbling into the ring of self-control conflict (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esm:wpaper:esmt-11-09

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