Income-Related Subsidies for Universal Health Insurance Premia: Exploring Alternatives Using the SWITCH Model

Tim Callan, Brian Colgan and John Walsh

No WP516, Papers from Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI)

Abstract: The Programme for Government indicated that under a Universal Health Insurance system, the State would pay insurance premia for people on low incomes and subsidise premia for people on middle incomes . This paper examines issues in the design of such a subsidy scheme, in the context of overall premium costs as estimated by Wren et al. (2015) and the KPMG (2015) study for the Health Insurance Authority. Subsidy design could involve a step-level system, similar to the medical card and GP visit card in the current system; or a smooth, tapered withdrawal of the subsidy, similar to what obtains for many cash benefits in the welfare system. The trade-offs between the income limit up to which a full subsidy would be payable, the rate of withdrawal of subsidy with respect to extra income and overall subsidy cost are explored.

Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
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