Revenue Non-Equivalence in Multidimensional Procurement Auctions under Asymmetry

Shivangi Chandel and Shubhro Sarkar

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: Using an example we show that the Revenue Equivalence in the Scoring Auctions, as postulated by Che (1993), no longer holds when the suppliers are asymmetric in their costs of production.

Keywords: Auctions; Public Procurement; Asymmetric Bidders; Multidimensional Bids. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05
Note: Institutional Papers
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