Will a Matchmaker Invite her Potential Rival in?

Rupayan Pal

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: This paper analyzes optimal strategies of an incumbent intermediary, who matches agents on the two sides of a market, in the presence of entry threat under alternative scenarios.

Keywords: Entry accommodation; Entry deterrence; Intermediation; Matching; Two-sided; market; Entry accommodation; Entry deterrence; online businesses; matrimonial website; services; marketplaces (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05
Note: Institutional Papers
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:10687

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