Is “Make in India†Constrained by Indian Labour Market Regulations?

Ajeet Mathur ()

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: This paper examines whether “Make in India†policies are constrained by over-regulation or under-regulation in the Indian labour market. Specific labour law provisions and the scope of circumventing them as evidenced from strategy-as-practised are analysed. The paper concludes that the Indian Labour Market is under-governed and over-controlled because: (1) the nature of implicit “quid pro quo†grant of oligopolistic protection in the product market in the license raj period against reciprocal guarantees of lifelong employment protection has been nullified without being jettisoned from the tripartite frame; (2) the weakened countervailing power of trade unions has affected social dialogue required to balance the interests of organized and unorganized workers, and (3) the failure of successive governments to put employment in mission mode has shrunk the real price of skilled labour to unprecedented lows and in some cases even below statutory minimum wages. [W.P. No. 2016-03-57]

Keywords: Make in India; Indian Labour Regulations; Strategy-as-practised (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
Note: Institutional Papers
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.esocialsciences.org/Download/repecDownl ... AId=11093&fref=repec

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:11093

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from eSocialSciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Padma Prakash ().